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REVISITING BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES IN TAKINGS
LITIGATION
Michael C. Blumm*
Rachel G. Wolfard**
Abstract
Libertarian property rights enthusiasts celebrated the United States
Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council as a landmark decision that would revolutionize interpretation of
the Constitution’s takings clause and finally fulfill its potential as a
vehicle for deregulation. Over a quarter-century later, the Lucas decision
has failed to meet those expectations. A major reason is that Justice
Antonin Scalia’s opinion created an exception that effectively swallowed
the rule that Lucas established.
Lucas held that land use regulations whose effect on landowners’
property produced a total loss of economic value were per se categorical
takings. However, Justice Scalia qualified the categorical rule by creating
an exception if the regulation merely replicated “background principles”
of property or nuisance law. His Lucas opinion explained that an
examination of background principles was a “logically antecedent
inquiry” in takings cases because it defined the nature of the alleged
“private property” taken by the regulation. Over the years, courts have
interpreted the background principles rule expansively, while the per se
takings rule has rarely applied.
Background principles, as an inquiry antecedent to takings claims,
demand analysis of applicable property and nuisance law because they
determine the nature of the “private property” alleged to have been taken.
Consequently, this examination is step one of any claim for
compensation—regardless of whether it is an alleged physical occupation
or appropriation, an economic wipeout, or a regulatory taking subject to
judicial balancing. Step two—determining whether there has been a
taking requiring government compensation—cannot proceed until a court
conducts the initial inquiry into the alleged property right.
This Article surveys recent background principles cases and builds on
earlier studies. The survey reveals that courts have continued to recognize
common law background principles such as the public trust doctrine, the
navigation servitude, customary rights, and even burial rights. In addition
to common law background principles, courts have found numerous
statutory background principles—including public ownership of wildlife
and water, zoning, and federal mining regulations. Other cases have
rejected the categorization of some statutes as background principles,
including wetland regulations, environmental impact statement
1
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requirements, and flood control operations.
Background principles are likely to continue to be a dynamic area of
property and constitutional takings law for the foreseeable future because
the issue will be raised early in nearly every takings case, and the results
may be as varied as the states’ interpretation of their property and
nuisance laws. Background principles should thus prove a fruitful source
of state court modern interpretations of vintage doctrines like the public
trust doctrine, customary rights, and public ownership of wildlife and
water, and even burial rights. These cases will likely make takings law a
vibrant area of property law for years to come.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................
I.

THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN BACKGROUND
PRINCIPLES DEFENSE .................................................................

II.

THE SUPREME COURT’S POST-LUCAS CONSIDERATION
OF BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES ....................................................

III.

COMMON LAW BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES IN THE
LOWER COURTS.........................................................................
A. Property .............................................................................
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2. The Navigation Servitude ............................................
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4. Burial Rights ...............................................................
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F. Homestead Exemptions ......................................................
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B. Physical Takings ................................................................
CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution forbids the governmental taking of “private
property” for public use without paying just compensation.1 A
prerequisite to constitutionally-owed compensation is therefore a
“taking” of “private property.” Since 1922, takings have included not
merely physical occupations or appropriations, but also regulatory
takings.2 Most of the commentary on the so-called “takings issue” has
concerned the nature of regulations restricting private property sufficient
to amount to a taking.3 But the initial judicial inquiry in takings litigation
involves defining the “private property” at issue, because without a
sufficient private property interest there can be no taking. The private
property inquiry, in turn, requires judicial interpretation of “background
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. We
thank John Echeverria for many helpful comments on a draft of this paper, which was discussed
at a faculty colloquium at Lewis and Clark Law School and in a class at Vermont Law School,
and we thank the participants in both for their suggestions.
** 3L, Lewis and Clark Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”); see Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
(incorporating the takings clause, the first provision of the Bill of Rights to be applicable to the
states, through the Fourteenth Amendment); STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 1-1 (5th
ed. 2012); Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307,
310 (2007) (“Takings law flows from eminent domain: the inherent power of the sovereign to
take private property . . . .”); Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, WASH.
U. L. (1995), http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/articles/brief_hx_taking.htm [https://perma.cc/6JYVL29W] (“[I]n the last quarter century, [the Takings] clause has taken on a prominent role in
constitutional jurisprudence, particularly with respect to the limits of state and local regulatory
power.”); Joseph Y. Whealdon, A Primer in Eminent Domain and Takings Law Under the U.S.
Constitution,
A.B.A.
(Aug.
27,
2013),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/
primer_eminent_domain_takings_law_under_us_constitution/ [https://perma.cc/XA6M-9EZH]
(“This ‘Takings Clause’ provides that if the government seizes private property, that property’s
owner must receive fair compensation.”).
2. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[I]f regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking.”).
3. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967) (“We shall be
dealing here with matters which, were they to find their way into a treatise on the law of eminent
domain, would appear in the chapter on ‘What Constitutes a Taking: General Principles.’”);
Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (1991)
(“Intense interest stems partly from the Supreme Court’s professed inability to provide a general
solution to the takings problem . . . .”).
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principles” that shape the nature of property interests at issue. 4 This
Article explores recent case law interpreting the meaning of those
background principles of property law.
In 1992, the Supreme Court initiated what was widely thought to be
an unprecedented era in property law jurisprudence when Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council5 established a new categorical rule for
regulatory takings law.6 According to Lucas, regulations that deprived
landowners of all economic value in their land amounted to per se
takings,7 an exception to the generally applicable judicial balancing rule
the Court established in its 1978 decision, Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City.8 Commentators who were critical of takings law
and who believed that Penn Central failed to impose meaningful
restraints on government regulation heralded the new per se rule as a
welcome sea change that would usher in a new era of judicial oversight
of regulations affecting land use.9
That sea change never happened.
Justice Scalia’s opinion equated oppressive regulations with
permanent physical occupations that seize virtually all of a landowner’s
rights and therefore categorically demand governmental compensation.10
But this new per se rule contained an exception that has become a
4. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
5. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6. Id. at 1004.
7. Id. at 1030 (“When . . . a regulation that declares ‘off-limits’ all economically
productive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would
dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it.”).
8. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that courts must consider multiple factors when
considering regulatory takings claims, including (1) the character of the government action, (2)
the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, and (3) the regulation’s interference with the
landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations). See generally John J. Costonis,
Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
465 (1983) (discussing the judicial balancing test and advocating for a different approach); John
D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171 (2005)
(discussing the Penn Central factors).
9. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web
of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (1993) (describing the Lucas decision as
“anticlimactic”); James L. Huffman, Lucas: A Small Step in the Right Direction, 23 ENVTL. L.
901, 901–02 (1993) (“Lucas . . . has promise from the point of view of those interested in
maintaining a coherent system of property rights, not to mention those interested in complying
with the Constitution.”); see also Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory
Takings Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601, 625 (2014) (“Given that the categorical rule of Lucas
permits no remaining viable use . . . almost all property owners who might claim a regulatory
taking would have to do so under the Penn Central standard.” (footnote omitted)).
10. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (“[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”).
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categorical governmental defense to takings claims, undermining the
revolutionary potential of the Lucas per se rule. Justice Scalia announced
that there was no categorical taking for economic wipeouts if a
government regulation merely replicated a restriction that the common
law imposed on landowners through background principles of nuisance
or property law.11 This background principles defense—largely, although
not exclusively,12 a function of state law—has swallowed the categorical
per se takings rule Lucas established, simply because there are many
more background principles than economic wipeouts.13
What constitutes a valid background principles defense has proved to
be a contentious and unsettled question over a quarter-century later. But
as this Article shows, lower courts interpreting the background principles
defense have successfully charted its outlines, and it is now a prominent
feature of takings jurisprudence.14
The evolution of the background principles defense is evident in
recent cases extending the defense to statutory and regulatory
restrictions—as anticipated by Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence
in Lucas15— as well as in decisions applying it to all takings claims, not

11. Id. at 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part
of his title to begin with.”).
12. See infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing private property created by federal
law).
13. This submerging of the categorical rule beneath the background principles defense was
evident within a decade of the decision. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s
Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 325–26 (2005) (describing the narrow range of categorical takings due to
complete economic wipeouts; contrasting it with the expansive scope of the background principles
defense); Michael C. Blumm & J.B. Ruhl, Background Principles, Takings, and Libertarian
Property, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 805, 805 (2010) (explaining the continuing importance of the
background principles defense and responding to the errors of a libertarian colleague); Echeverria,
supra note 8, at 173 (“[T]his approach had the potential benefit of identifying actions that would
be safely immune from takings liability – assuming these per se tests came to define not only the
grounds, but also the outer limits, of takings liability.”); John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman,
“Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 331, 376–81 (2003) (discussing the background principles defense in relation to
wildlife protection). The inapplicability of the takings clause to public property like oysters was
reinforced by Supreme Court’s decision in Horne v. Department of Agriculture (Horne II). 135
S. Ct. 2419 (2015); see infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
14. At the outset, we should acknowledge that we consider background principles cases to
be all those in which the reviewing court considers the nature of the alleged property interest as
an inquiry antecedent to the takings analysis, even if the court did not expressly mention the terms
“background principles.”
15. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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just those alleging a categorical, per se taking.16 The latter extension
seems justified, seeing as all takings claims are premised on the alleged
governmental taking of private property, and background principles
define the nature of a landowner’s legitimate property interests. The
nature of a landowner’s property interest is thus a foundational issue in
all takings cases.
Extending the background principles defense to all takings claims has
occurred despite the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,17 in which the Court rejected a background principles
defense for all land development inconsistent with existing regulations.18
Palazzolo reduced the effect of a pre-existing regulation to a pertinent
factor that courts must account for in deciding the secondary issue of
whether there has been a taking.19 Thus, not all pre-existing regulations
are background principles—although some may be—and pre-existing
regulations that are not background principles may still be important
factors weighing against takings claims.20 One inquiry this Article
investigates is when a pre-existing statute or regulation becomes a
background principle, as opposed to merely a factor in determining when
a taking has occurred.21
One complication to the application of a background principles
defense concerns the alleged takings of water rights for the benefit of
species listed under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).22 The
venue for such takings by the federal government lies in the Court of
Federal Claims (CFC) and the Federal Circuit.23 After some initial
16. See infra Part V.
17. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
18. Id. at 629–30 (“It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State’s
law by mere virtue of the passage of title.”). The Court instead reduced the effect of a pre-existing
regulation to a pertinent factor in Penn Central balancing. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Investment-backed expectations, though important, are not talismanic under Penn Central.
Evaluation of the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations instead is one factor
that points toward the answer to the question whether the application of a particular regulation to
particular property ‘goes too far.’”).
19. See id. at 629–30 (majority opinion).
20. See id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Today's holding does not mean that the
timing of the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn
Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the
takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance.”).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 83–89.
22. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012)).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012); id. § 1491(a)(1); see also ROBERT MELTZ, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) AND CLAIMS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
“TAKINGS” 5 (2013) (“[A] taking claim against the United States . . . must be filed in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims, if plaintiff seeks more than $10,000.”); see also id. at 5 n.33 (“On the
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confusion,24 the CFC now considers alleged takings of water rights to be
physical rather than regulatory takings.25 That interpretation may remove
alleged takings of water rights from Penn Central balancing, but
background principles remain the “logically antecedent inquiry”
concerning the nature of the allegedly taken “property” interest in
physical takings cases, even alleged water rights takings.26
This Article assesses the background principles defense. Part I
discusses its resurrection in Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion. Part II
considers subsequent Supreme Court statements about background
principles over the last couple of decades. Part III evaluates recent lower
court decisions in both state and federal jurisdictions concerning common
law background principles, considering both nuisance and property law
cases. Part IV turns to statutory background principles, where the defense
has had its greatest effect. Part V shows that background principles are
not confined to Lucas-type economic wipeouts but also extend to Penn
Central-type takings and physical takings. Finally, this Article concludes
that the background principles defense, as the first issue for resolution in
takings cases, will remain a vibrant area of takings jurisprudence because
rare occasion that an ESA taking claim seeks $10,000 or less, the claim may be filed either in the
Court of Federal Claims or in district court.”).
24. See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (concluding that “the government physically appropriated water that Casitas held a
usufructuary right in” because “the government did not merely require some water to remain in
stream, but instead actively caused the physical diversion of water”); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v.
United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 477 (2011) (“[I]t is difficult, conceptually, to think of a right to
beneficial use as being physically taken . . . .”), aff’d, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Casitas
Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (2007) (explaining the Supreme Court’s
Tahoe-Sierra decision compelled the CFC to categorize water diversion restrictions as regulatory
takings because they involve restraints on beneficial use, rather than government takeovers of
property), rev’d, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United
States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001) (“In the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use—
the hallmark of a regulatory action—completely eviscerates the right itself . . . .”).
25. Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 472 (“While the government has interfered with plaintiff’s
ability to divert water . . . it remains to be seen whether the government’s actions will subsequently
interfere with Casitas’s beneficial use of its water.”); Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319; see infra
notes 180–190 and accompanying text.
26. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); see Baley v. United States,
134 Fed. Cl. 619, 679–80 (2017) (declining to find a taking due to government restrictions
imposed on diversions diminishing the flow into Klamath Lake to preserve habitat for endangered
fish species because of senior reserved water rights possessed by the Klamath tribes); infra notes
199–200 and accompanying text. The usufructuary nature of a water right makes it an especially
unlikely vehicle for takings claims, since a water right is only a temporary-use right, whose scope
is limited by state-imposed restrictions like beneficial use and public interest factors. See infra
Part V. In some water rights takings cases, the CFC has unnecessarily complicated the application
of background principles by assigning a high burden of proof to the federal government regarding
the existence of a background principle of state law. See infra Part V.
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it represents an essential governmental defense against landowner
compensation claims.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN BACKGROUND
PRINCIPLES DEFENSE
Today’s background principles defense was brought into focus by
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, which initially appeared to be a groundbreaking advance for
landowners’ rights.27 Although that promise has since evaporated, the
background principles defense has endured because it serves an important
purpose: protecting federal, state, and local governments from
compensation duties that would surely chill vital land use and
environmental regulation.28 The rise of the background principles defense
transformed takings cases by interjecting a threshold examination of the
nature of the property rights that a landowner actually possesses before
inquiring whether that right has been taken by government action—an
inquiry not previously emphasized in takings case law.29
The Lucas controversy is well known and need not be retraced in
detail here.30 David Lucas purchased two oceanfront lots in 1986, with
the intention of developing them for vacation-home sales.31 His plans
were subverted in 1988 when South Carolina enacted the Beachfront
Management Act,32 which prohibited new building on beaches to protect

27. Justice Scalia cited Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900), which found no taking
where a government pier blocked access of a riparian landowner to Lake Superior, id. at 163, as
a background principles precedent. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. Other vintage background principles
cases not cited by Justice Scalia in Lucas include: Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.
349, 353, 356 (1908) (rejecting a water rights taking claim on the ground that such rights are
subject to the government’s valid exercise of its police power); United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945) (rejecting an alleged taking on navigation servitude
grounds).
28. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 156 (2016) (“If . . . eminent domain law and regulatory takings law begin to
subject ordinary administrative acts to a more stringent level of judicial scrutiny . . . the state’s
willingness to take any administrative measures affecting property interests likely will be
chilled.”).
29. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 367.
30. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Lucas v. the Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to
Promote More Efficient Regulation, in PROPERTY STORIES 299, 302–18 (Gerald Korngold &
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009); see also, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1433, 1434–46 (1993) (summarizing Lucas’s factual and legal background).
31. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07
32. 1988 S.C. Acts 634; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07 (1992).
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public safety and prevent erosion.33 Lucas filed suit challenging the
application of the statute to his lots and claimed he was owed
compensation for a taking of his property rights.34 The trial court agreed
with Lucas, awarding him approximately $1.2 million.35 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the statutory
prohibition of building on the beach was tantamount to avoiding a
nuisance, and no landowner had a right to maintain a nuisance.36 Aided
by numerous amici, Lucas appealed the decision to the United States
Supreme Court.37
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and announced that if the effect
of the Beachfront Management Act to Lucas’s tracts deprived him of all
economic use, he was in fact entitled to just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.38 Property rights and development enthusiasts celebrated
the Court’s 6–3 decision39 as a major victory in their efforts to advance
property rights at the expense of governmental regulation.40 But Justice
Scalia’s opinion was more nuanced: it read takings jurisprudence as
providing the government with a defense—even against the complete
economic wipeouts that he declared otherwise warranted categorical
compensation—if governmental regulations merely replicate common
law restrictions.41
33. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007. The Beachfront Management Act was enacted to prevent the
building of nuisances on coastal dunes, which function as a storm barrier to protect life and
property. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (1990).
34. Lucas was never denied a building permit—instead, he claimed that the statute
precluded the Coastal Division of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control from issuing a building permit, even though South Carolina amended the Beachfront
Management Act to allow the Council to issue a special permit at variance with the Act’s general
limitations. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010–12; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1).
35. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992)).
35. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991),
36. Id. at 899–900.
37. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1005 n.*.
38. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 502 U.S. 966 (1991) (accepting certiorari); Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1031–32.
39. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, O’Connor, and Thomas. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1005, 1006. Justice Kennedy filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, but disagreeing that background principles were limited to
common law. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The common law of
nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power . . . .”). Justice Blackmun
filed a dissenting opinion, id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), as did Justice Stevens, id. at
1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter filed a separate statement, alleging that certiorari
was improvidently granted. Id. at 1076 (Souter, J.).
40. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text.
41. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (“A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words,
do no more than duplicate the result . . . [of] the courts . . . under the State’s law of private
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The background principles exception proved to be much more
important than the per se takings rule it established.42 This Article
explores the legacy of background principles below.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S POST-LUCAS CONSIDERATION OF
BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
One of the Supreme Court’s first post-Lucas mentions of the
background principles defense was in the well-known Bush v. Gore43
decision, in which the Court stopped vote recounts in the presidential
election of 2000, allowing George W. Bush to assume the presidency.44
In a footnote, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that background principles
of property law determine whether there was an unconstitutional taking,
but also averred,
our jurisprudence requires us to analyze the “background
principles” of state property law to determine whether there
has been a taking of property in violation of the Takings
Clause. That constitutional guarantee would, of course,
afford no protection against state power if our inquiry could
be concluded by a state supreme court, holding that state
property law accorded the plaintiff no rights.45
The Court thus reaffirmed its intention to oversee assertions of the
state law background principles defense established by Lucas.46 This
nuisance . . . .”); id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The State should not be
prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts
must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source.”).
42. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 367.
43. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Explaining that the Supreme Court generally defers to state court
interpretations of state law, the Court cited takings law as one of a few “areas in which the
Constitution requires this Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state
law.” Id. at 114; see also R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941)
(holding that federal courts ought not decide federal constitutional issues if a definitive ruling on
a state law would terminate the controversy, establishing the so-called Pullman abstention
doctrine).
44. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also, Jack M. Balkin, Bush v.
Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408 (2001) (“[T]he case
decided the outcome of a presidential election . . . .”).
45. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
46. The Lucas opinion signaled that the Court was prepared to oversee assertions by state
courts of background principles: “We stress that an affirmative decree eliminating all
economically beneficial uses may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application of
relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is
presently found.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18. Presumably, ensuring the “objectively
reasonable” application of state law by state courts would be the responsibility of reviewing
federal courts.
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announcement promised some federalism tension in takings cases.47
In 2001, nine years after Lucas, the Supreme Court issued a divided
decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, in which a six-justice majority
ruled that land use regulations in existence at the time a claimant acquired
title were not inherently background principles.48 Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion announced that if all pre-existing regulations were
background principles defeating takings claims, the result would put too
“potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle” of property rights,
absolving the state “of its obligation to defend any action restricting land
use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable,” effectively putting an
expiration date on restrictions that might otherwise warrant
compensation.49
The Court majority acknowledged that legislation could amount to a
background principle but declined to state when a statute would earn this
47. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
101 (1995) (“Judicial supervision of local governments facilitates federalism in the same way that
enforcement of promises permits governments to confer benefits on future generations. A larger
license for judges to change what they regard as inefficient laws adopted by higher levels of
government is unwarranted, however.”); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The
Takings Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 473 (2000) (“[W]hen the
Takings Clause is applied to local land use regulation, it must be tempered with a concern for
federalism.”).
Federalism tensions will be exacerbated due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick
v. Township of Scott, No. 17-647, 2019 WL 2552486 (June 21, 2019), decided while this Article
was in press. In Knick, a 5–4 majority overruled Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, which held that a property owner must exhaust
state remedies before bringing a takings claim in federal court, effectively meaning that the only
federal review of state takings claims is through Supreme Court review of state supreme court
decisions. 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). Knick involved a local law that (1) allowed public officials
to enter private property to determine whether a cemetery exists, and (2) required all cemeteries
to be open to the public during daylight hours, even burial plots in the backyard of a private house.
Id. at 314. Knick, a landowner with burial plots, claimed that these requirements amounted to a
denial of her right to exclude and therefore required compensation, but the state courts denied
compensation. The Supreme Court’s reversal will allow the landowner to pursue her claim in
federal court, but her chances of obtaining compensation are remote. See infra notes 128–35 and
accompanying text.
48. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001). In Palazzolo, a landowner
attempted to develop a twenty-acre tract bordering on Long Island Sound, eighteen acres of which
were wetlands and submerged lands. Id. at 613–15. The Rhode Island Coastal Resource
Management Council denied the landowner development permits because building on the site
would have a significant adverse effect on nearby waters and wetlands, and the Rhode Island
courts upheld the Council. Id. at 614–16 (majority opinion).
49. Id. at 627; see also id. at 628 (“A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no
compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty
to compensate for what is taken. . . . It would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings
claim because of the post-enactment transfer of ownership where the steps necessary to make the
claim ripe were not taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous owner.”).
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status.
The opinion did explain, however, that an otherwise
unconstitutional regulation “is not transformed into a background
principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title.”50
Recognizing a kind of equal protection implicit in the takings clause, 51
Justice Kennedy announced that “[a] regulation or common-law rule
cannot be a background principle for some owners and not for others.”52
50. See id. at 629–30.
51. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630. A similar equal protection rationale was evident in
Justice Brennan’s decision in Penn Central. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 133–34 n.30 (1978) (“These cases are better understood as resting not on any supposed
‘noxious’ quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were
reasonably related to the implementation of a policy—not unlike historic preservation—expected
to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property.”
(emphasis added)). Courts could conclude that a landowner who purchased with notice of a
regulatory restriction might not be “similarly situated” to one without notice. See Sean B. Hecht,
Taking Background Principles Seriously in the Context of Sea-Level Rise, 39 VT. L. REV. 781,
786 (2015) (advocating that background principles be applied “evenhandedly”).
52. Id. at 630. Justice O’Connor concurred in the result, agreeing that not all pre-existing
regulations were background principles. Id. at 632. But she emphasized that notice of such a
regulation was an important factor in deciding whether there was a takings under the balancing
authorized by Penn Central. Id. at 632–33 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Today's holding does not
mean that the timing of the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial
to the Penn Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration
from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance. . . . [I]nterference with
investment-back expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine. Further,
the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape
the reasonableness of those expectations.”). The Court majority in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency approvingly cited Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.
535 U.S. 302, 335 (2002) (“[F]or reasons set out at some length by Justice O’Connor in her
concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island we are persuaded that the better approach to
claims that a regulation has effected a temporary taking ‘requires careful examination and
weighing of all the relevant circumstances.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at
636 (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
The notice requirement has proved an important, perhaps critical factor in several cases.
See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 527 (1998) (“Nor did the MPPAA interfere with
employers’ reasonable investment-backed expectations, for, by the time of the MPPAA’s
enactment, ‘[p]rudent employers . . . had more than sufficient notice not only that pension plans
were currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial
obligations.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S.
211, 227 (1986))); see also, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645–46 (1993) (“At the time Concrete Pipe purchased Cen-Vi-Ro
and began its contributions to the Plan, pension plans had long been subject to federal regulation
. . . . Concrete Pipe’s reliance on ERISA’s original limitation of contingent liability to 30% of net
worth is misplaced, there being no reasonable basis to expect that the legislative ceiling would
never be lifted.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104–05 (1985)
(observing that public mining claimants take their “fully recognized possessory interests in . . . a
‘unique form of property’” with notice of the federal government’s underlying fee title and its
“substantial regulatory power over those interests” (quoting Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co.,
371 U.S. 334, 335 (1963)).
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On remand, the Rhode Island Superior Court decided Palazzolo on the
basis of background principles. The court ruled that the state’s public trust
doctrine and its public nuisance law foreclosed Palazzolo’s takings
claim.53 The Rhode Island Supreme Court decided not to review the case
again after remand, ending Palazzolo’s decades-long effort to fill
shorelands for development.54
In 2002, a year after Palazzolo, the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency rejected a
physical takings claim concerning a moratorium on land development
adjacent to Lake Tahoe.55 In reaffirming that takings claims require
judicial consideration of the whole property, the Court majority, per
Justice John Paul Stevens, decided that the whole property included not
just metes and bounds but also time. The court also ruled that it should
not give a temporary land-use restriction “exclusive significance,” but
instead that restriction should be merely a factor to account for under the
Penn Central balancing rule.56 The Tahoe-Sierra majority clarified that
the Lucas categorical per se rule was a narrow exception to the general
Penn Central balancing rule.57
The next Supreme Court brush with background principles occurred
in 2010 in the curious case of Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
53. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *3–6 (R.I. Super. Ct. July
5, 2005) (determining that the public trust doctrine foreclosed the claim of lands above the lower
water mark, and that public nuisance doctrine foreclosed the claim of lands above the high water
mark).
54. Palazzolo v. State, 785 A.2d 561, 561 (R.I. 2001).
55. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337–38. Justice Stevens wrote for a six-member majority;
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the three-member dissent. Id. at 305. Future Chief Justice John
Roberts represented the interstate planning agency. See Brief for Respondents at 1, Tahoe-Sierra,
535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1480565.
56. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331, 337. The Court specifically rejected a rule requiring
compensation for every delay in “routine” permitting because that would either make government
considerations “prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking.” Id. at 335. This
admonition would seem to weigh against the type of temporary judicial takings alleged in Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702,
704 (2010), and Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117 Acres, No. 10-1232-DWBMLB, 2013 WL 3328773, at *9 (D. Kan. July 2, 2013). See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying
text. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe-Sierra characterized the development moratorium
as extending to six years (rather than the thirty-two months the majority employed), claiming that
a moratorium of this length could not be a background principle of state property law. See TahoeSierra, 535 U.S. at 351–52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] moratorium prohibiting all
economic use for a period of six years is not one of the longstanding, implied limitations of state
property law.”).
57. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332 (“[T]hese cases make clear that the categorical rule in
Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives
property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory taking context, we require a
more fact specific inquiry.”).
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Florida Department of Environmental Protection,58 where the Court
unanimously rejected a takings claim involving a beach restoration
project in the wake of several hurricanes.59 Adjacent landowners objected
to a state-imposed condition requiring new sand provided by the state to
be shared by the public, but the Court agreed that the state court’s
rejection of the landowners’ takings claims was fully justified.60 The
unanimous Court agreed that the result was consistent with background
principles of Florida law, which makes clear that landowners lack any
compensable property rights as a result of avulsive changes to beaches,
such a beach-restoration project.61
58. 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
59. Id. at 707, 713, 733.
60. Id. at 710–11, 729–31. All nine members of the Court agreed that there was no takings,
but four members of the Court used the case to announce the view that judicial takings were a
possibility (presumably when a state court’s interpretation of state law was unexpected, perhaps
unsettling reasonable expectations). Id. at 707, 728; see Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington on that issue arguably conforms to reasonable expectations, we must of course accept
it as conclusive.”).
61. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 731–32. Avulsion is the process by which land is
covered or uncovered by a sudden or violent change in shoreline, see Avulsion, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), whereas accretion is the process by which land is covered or
uncovered gradually and imperceptibly, see Accretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). When avulsions occur, private property boundaries remain the same, whereas when
accretions occur, property boundaries move along with the shoreline. See, e.g., Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Boundaries Along a Waterbody, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.03(b)(2) (Amy
K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2019) (examining the legal consequences of accretion and avulsion for
property owners); Hecht, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 789 (maintaining that
the doctrines of avulsion and accretion constitute background principles); Joseph L. Sax, The
Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 306
(2010) (explaining avulsion and accretion). The Court suggested that the state might reconsider
the role of state-created avulsions like beach-restoration projections. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at
732. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence stated, “the Court should consider with care the decision to
extend the Takings Clause in a manner that might be inconsistent with historical practice.” Id. at
739 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Hughes, 389 U.S. at 294–96 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the Court should have evaluated whether the Washington Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the state constitution to deprive landowners of the right to future accretions of
oceanfront property was a takings). A four-member plurality of the Court in Stop the Beach built
on the Stewart concurrence in Hughes and stated that while the state’s public access condition
took no property, a court decision could in fact take property, raising a multitude of questions that
have yet to be resolved. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 707, 730 (“There is no taking unless petitioner
can show that, before the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, littoral-property owners had rights to
future accretions and contact with the water superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged
land.” (emphasis added)). Justice Breyer cautioned against the plurality’s endorsement of judicial
takings, worrying that the losing party in state courts would routinely pursue a collateral attack in
federal court. Id. at 744–45 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he approach the plurality would take
today threatens to open the federal-court doors to constitutional review of many, perhaps large
numbers of, state-law cases in an area of law familiar to state, but not federal, judges. . . . creat[ing]
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Soon thereafter, in 2012, in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v.
United States,62 a unanimous Supreme Court decided that temporary
flooding of state lands due to federal dam operations could constitute a
taking under the Penn Central balancing rule.63 The Court suggested that
the result could have been different, however, had the government
asserted background principles as a categorical defense to takings
liability.64 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg announced that “governmentinduced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption
from Takings Clause inspection,” although she acknowledged that the
Court was “not equipped to address the bearing, if any, of Arkansas water
rights law on this case” because the Federal Circuit did not examine the
issue, implying that state water law could function as a background
principle.65
A potentially overlooked Supreme Court decision occurred in 2015
when the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Horne v. United States
Department of Agriculture, ruling that a federal “raisin reserve”—which
employed marketing orders and agreements to withhold a portion of
harvests in reserve to inflate prices for raisin producers66—worked as an
unconstitutional taking of a grower’s raisins.67 A five-justice majority
overturned the lower court’s decision, which held that personal property,
like raisins, was not subject to the same level of scrutiny as real
the distinct possibility that federal judges would play a major role in the shaping of a matter of
significant state interest—state property law.”); see Michael C. Blumm & Elizabeth B. Dawson,
The Florida Beach Case and the Road to Judicial Takings, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 713, 757–58 (2011) (noting that Justice Kennedy, troubled both by procedural and remedial
questions concerning judicial takings, observed that the due process clause provided an
appropriate and adequate remedy limiting judicial authority concerning property rights); Mary
Doyle & Stephen J. Schnably, Going Rogue: Stop the Beach Renourishment as an Object of
Morbid Fascination, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 83, 114 (2012) (“Any time a federal court answers the
question whether an established right was eliminated, it will of necessity engage in an act of
judgment—or rather, of second-guessing states’ judgments—about how property should be
regulated.”).
62. 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
63. Id. at 26, 34, 37–38.
64. Id. at 38.
65. Id.; see infra Section IV.D (discussing public ownership of water).
66. Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct.
2419 (2015). The raisin reserve, established during the Great Depression of the 1930s, authorized
a committee of raisin industry representatives appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture to
withhold a percentage of raisins from the market to maintain high prices for growers like Horne.
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. (Horne II), 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2421 (2015). Earlier, the Supreme Court
had reversed the Ninth Circuit on jurisdictional grounds. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. (Horne I), 133
S. Ct. 2053, 2063–64 (2013), rev’g 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012).
67. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2437 (explaining that a governmental mandate to relinquish
property interests as a condition to engage in interstate commerce constitutes a per se takings in
this case) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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property.68 Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the dichotomy,
maintaining that for some 800 years, personal property had been given
virtually the same protection as realty, and therefore the physical
appropriation of federal raisin reserves amounted to a per se taking.69
Yet, in response to an eighty-year-old precedent upholding a similar
scheme imposed by the state of Maryland concerning oysters,70 the Chief
Justice distinguished oysters from raisins. The former were wildlife
belonging to the state under state law (ferae naturae), while the latter
were private property: “the fruit of the growers’ labor—not ‘public things
subject to the absolute control of the state.’”71 Without expressly
mentioning background principles, the case turned on the distinction
between the private property character of raisins and the background
principle of state ownership of wildlife.72
The most recent Supreme Court case involving background
principles, Murr v. Wisconsin,73 involved determining the proper parcel
for judicial evaluation in a takings claim, the so-called “denominator” of
the takings fraction.74 In 1975, in an effort to protect the adjacent St.
Croix River, a federally designated wild and scenic river, the state of
Wisconsin and St. Croix County forbade the sale or development of
communally owned, contiguous lots as separate lots smaller than one acre
of developable land.75 The Murrs, who wanted to sell one of their adjacent
lots to finance the redevelopment of the other, claimed that the required
merger of the lots constituted a taking, alleging a complete deprivation of

68. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1144 (“[G]overnmental regulation of personal property is more
foreseeable, and thus less intrusive, than is the taking of real property.”).
69. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
70. In Leonard v. Earle, the Court approved a state requirement that oyster packers remit
10% of their marketable oyster shells as a condition of the privilege of harvesting oysters in state
waters. 279 U.S. 392, 396 (1929).
71. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2431 (quoting Leonard v. Earle, 141 A. 714, 716 (Md. 1928)).
72. See John D. Echeverria & Michael C. Blumm, Horne v. Department of Agriculture:
Expanding Per Se Takings While Endorsing State Sovereign Ownership of Wildlife, 75 MD. L.
REV. 657, 688–96 (2016).
73. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
74. Id. at 1945 (“[N]o single consideration can supply the exclusive test for determining the
denominator.”); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497
(1987) (“Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been
taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the critical questions
is determining how to define the unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of
the fraction.’” (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967))); Eagle,
supra note 9, at 631 (noting that the answer to the denominator question may be outcome
determinative).
75. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
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all economic use of one of the merged lots.76
A five-justice majority, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, invoked the
Court’s whole-property jurisprudence77 to conclude that the relevant
parcel for the denominator of the takings fraction was the sum of the two
contiguous lots, which together retained considerable economic value.78
Justice Kennedy indicated that the Court would not consider the state’s
definition of property rights to be “coextensive” with the takings clause79
because no one consideration would supply a litmus for the denominator.
Instead, a number of factors—such as state and local law, the physical
characteristics of the land, and the land’s prospective value—were
relevant.80 But the result of the case seemed to turn on the role of
longstanding state law, the 1975 merger provision. The merger provision,
according to the Court, was “a legitimate exercise of government power,
as reflected by its consistency with a long history of state and local merger
regulations that originated nearly a century ago.”81 If this characterization
was not the Court recognizing the merger provision as a background
principle of state law, it was quite close.82
This brief review of recent Supreme Court takings decisions indicates
that background principles clearly include statutes as well as common
76. Id. at 1941.
77. Id. at 1950; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002) (“[A] permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is a
taking of ‘the parcel as a whole.’”); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (“Some
of our cases indicate that the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory action is measured
against the value of the parcel as a whole . . . .”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (“In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole . . . .”).
78. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944. Justice Kennedy observed that the combined value of the two
lots, estimated at $698,300, was “far greater than the summed value of the separate regulated
lots.” Id. at 1949 (noting that the summed value of the separate lots was just $413,000).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1945. Justice Kennedy emphasized that “[i]n particular, it may be relevant that the
property is located in an area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or
other regulation.” Id. at 1945–46. Kennedy also noted that the relevant denominator (the size of
the property) was not the product of “a bright-line rule,” id. at 1949, or a “simple test,” id. at 1950.
Kennedy’s reliance on multi-factor balancing was quite typical. See Michael C. Blumm & Sherry
L. Bosse, Justice Kennedy and the Environment: Property, States’ Rights, and a Persistent Search
for Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REV. 667, 722 (2007).
81. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947. The Court noted that “[t]he land’s location along the river
is also significant,” explaining that the Murrs “could have anticipated public regulation might
affect their enjoyment of their property, as the Lower St. Croix was a regulated area under federal,
state, and local law before [they] possessed the land.” Id. at 1948.
82. The underlying regulation in the Supreme Court’s recent Knick v. Township of Scott
decision, concerning burial rights, may be a background principle. See discussion infra notes 128–
35 and accompanying text.
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law principles. The Court has yet to indicate how old a statute must be to
become a background principle, although not all regulations pre-dating a
claimant’s property acquisition qualify.83 There is some evidence that sixyear-old police powers are not old enough, but those of forty years may
be.84 Without expressly so declaring, the Court has assumed that normal
delays in permitting,85 state rules on avulsive changes in shoreline
lands,86 state ownership of wildlife,87 and land-use merger provisions88
can all be background principles. At least one of these state-law rules
originated as recently as 1975.89 Perhaps not surprisingly, the Court has
considered only cases involving state property law background principles
as opposed to nuisance cases requiring the Court to review a lower court’s
judicial balancing on a largely ad hoc basis.90
III. COMMON LAW BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES IN THE
LOWER COURTS
In Lucas, Justice Scalia emphasized that the “antecedent inquiry” into
the nature of a claimant’s property rights was an examination of
background principles of either property or nuisance law.91 Justice
83. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (discussing Palazzolo’s rejection of a
categorical rule that all regulations predating acquisition of title qualify as background principles).
84. Compare Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 352 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] moratorium prohibiting all economic use for
a period of six years is not one of the longstanding, implied limitations of state property law.”),
with Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940 (forty-year-old merger provisions).
85. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[D]elays attendant to
zoning and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state property law and part of a
landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.”).
86. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702,
730–31 (2010) (“[I]f an avulsion exposes land seaward of littoral property that had previously
been submerged, that land belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner’s contact
with the water. . . . The Florida Supreme Court decision . . . [was] consistent with the[] background
principles of state property law.”).
87. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. (Horne II), 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015) (“[T]he fruit of
the growers’ labor—'not public things subject to the absolute control of the state.’” (quoting
Leonard v. Earle, 141 A. 714, 716 (Md. 1928))).
88. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947 (“The merger provision here is likewise a legitimate
exercise of government power, as reflected by its consistency with a long history of state and local
merger regulations that originated nearly a century ago.”).
89. See supra text accompanying note 75 (discussing the lot-merger provision in Murr).
90. The lack of contested background nuisance cases may also reflect the fact that nuisance
liability seldom leaves affected property without value.
91. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003, 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that
deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with. This accords, we think, with our ‘takings’
jurisprudence, which has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding
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Scalia’s opinion gave examples of nuisance-like activities that would be
background principles, such as flooding or siting a nuclear power plant
on an earthquake fault.92 Earlier analyses confirmed that lower courts
invoked background principles of property and nuisance law with some
frequency.93 This Article considers the most recent cases involving each
in turn.
A. Property
According to recent case law, common law property rules that restrict
the viability of a takings claimant’s case include the public trust doctrine,
the navigation servitude, customary rights, and public rights to access
cemeteries.
1. The Public Trust Doctrine (PTD)
Although there are a number of decisions recognizing the public trust
doctrine (PTD) as a background principle,94 only one case of prominence
recently did so. In Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, the dispute involved two
North Carolina oceanfront property owners who claimed that a town
ordinance allowing the public to drive across their beachfront property
worked as a physical taking. 95 But the North Carolina Court of Appeals
the content of, and the State’s power over, the ‘bundle of rights’ that they acquire when they
obtain title to property.” (footnote omitted)).
92. See id. at 1029 (“[T]he owner of a lakebed, for example, would not be entitled to
compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that
would have the effect of flooding others’ land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating
plant, when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant
sits astride an earthquake fault.”).
93. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 325–26 (asserting that “the background
principles defense to takings liability is expansive,” as evidenced from application by “[c]ourts in
multiple jurisdictions”); Blumm & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 806 (“Over the last two decades, many
courts have employed the ‘background principles’ defense to uphold government regulations
accused of working unconstitutional losses of property rights.”); John D. Echeverria, The Public
Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
931, 944–50 (2012) (explaining that some background principles preclude takings claims without
barring the activity, while some ban the activity altogether).
94. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002)
(using PTD as a background principle to reject a landowner’s takings claim); Casitas Mun. Water
Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 458 (2011), aff’d, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119–20 (S.C. 2003) (using PTD to deny
compensation for denial of bulkhead construction permits in tidelands); Blumm & Ritchie, supra
note 13, at 341–44; Blumm & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 833–34; Echeverria, supra note 93, at 956–
70 (discussing the public trust doctrine in the context of alleged takings of water rights);
discussion infra Part VI (discussing Casitas); see also Hecht, supra note 51, at 784 (explaining
the broad agreement that the PTD is a background principle).
95. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 190, 192–93 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
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affirmed a lower court’s conclusion that the “antecedent inquiry” into the
landowners’ property rights revealed that they lacked the right to exclude
the public from the beach—a trust resource under state law.96 Relying on
“the long-standing customary right of access of the public to the dry sand
beaches of North Carolina,” the court concluded that the public had the
right since “time immemorial” to access dry sand beaches in the state.97
Thus, the adjacent landowners could not exclude the public from the
beach.98
Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, the 2011 CFC
decision that imposed this high burden, held that the government failed
to prove that water use restrictions imposed pursuant to the Endangered
Species Act could have been duplicated under background principles of
California water law but nevertheless held that the plaintiff’s claim was
unripe.99 A municipal water district claimed that the interruptions
amounted to physical takings100 and sought compensation from the
federal government.101 The government claimed that background
principles of state law, including the PTD, “inhere[d] in the [district’s]
title” and shielded the government from takings liability.102 Although the
CFC acknowledged that the listed species were public trust resources

96. Id. at 197.
97. Id. at 195–96 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d) (2013) (“[P]ublic right of access to
dry sand beaches in North Carolina is so firmly rooted in the custom and history of North Carolina
that it has become a part of the public consciousness.”); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d) (2018)
(“The public having made frequent, uninterrupted, and unobstructed use of the full width and
breadth of the ocean beaches of this State from time immemorial, this section shall not be
construed to impair the right of the people to the customary free use and enjoyment of the ocean
beaches, which rights remain reserved to the people of this State under the common law and are
a part of the common heritage of the State recognized by Article XIV, Section 5 of the Constitution
of North Carolina. These public trust rights in the ocean beaches are established in the common
law as interpreted and applied by the courts of this State.”).
98. See Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 201 (“[P]ublic access is permitted, and in fact guaranteed,
pursuant to the associated public trust rights.”).
99. See Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 445, 477–78.
100. An earlier case so held. See Tulare Lake Basin Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.
Cl. 313, 314 (2001); see also Echeverria, supra note 94, at 956–62 (analyzing Tulare Lake).
101. Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 445; see Echeverria, supra note 94, at 963–70 (analyzing
Casitas); see also discussion infra Part VI (discussing Casitas). Water is a public trust resource
under California law, eliminating any vested rights to continued water diversions, and requiring
the state to exercise continuous supervision over the water resource and its allocation between
consumptive and non-consumptive uses. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d
709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (“[T]he core of the public trust doctrine is the state’s authority as sovereign
to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable waters of the state and the
lands underlying those waters.”).
102. Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 452 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1029 (1992)).
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under California law,103 it decided that the federal restrictions on water
deliveries did not “merely parallel and make explicit the restrictions that
background principles of California water law already [have in] place.”104
This suggested to the court that the restrictions were not justified as
background principles.
The court proceeded to impose a high burden of proof on the
government, deciding that the government failed to demonstrate that the
public’s interest in serving the needs of the listed fish was more
compelling than the public interest as a whole, and therefore rejected the
PTD-based background principles defense.105 The assumption that a
federal court may decide that the PTD is inapplicable absent a separate
public interest determination is one that no California court has endorsed.
The curious result and reasoning of the case might have been a function
of the fact that the federal government was asserting the background
principles defense based on state, not federal, law.106 The result suggested
that the defense could be subject to competing public interest balancing
tests, seemingly inconsistent with the “logically antecedent” inquiry into
the nature of the claimant’s property interest, involving a narrower
focus.107
2. The Navigation Servitude
The navigation servitude, which Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion
expressly recognized as a background principle,108 is a somewhat
mysterious doctrine as it provides an exemption from takings liability for
103. Id. at 459 (“Defendant has convincingly shown that the steelhead trout are a public trust
resource and that the state of California is concerned with their preservation.”).
104. Id. at 455–56.
105. See id. at 460–61. The court also rejected a statutory background principles defense,
based on section 5937 of the state’s Fish and Game Code, which read:
The owner of any dam shall allow sufficient water at all times to pass through
a fishway, or in the absence of a fishway, allow sufficient water to pass over,
around, or through the dam to keep in good condition any fish that may be planted
or exist below the dam.
Id. at 455 n.15, 460–61 (quoting CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937). In doing so, the court reasoned
that “Section 5937 provides no quantifiable standard that would allow this court to determine
whether requirements of the biological opinion and Section 5937 are one and the same.” Casitas,
102 Fed. Cl. at 462; see Karrigan S. Börk et al., The Rebirth of California Fish & Game Code
Section 5937: Water for Fish, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 813 (2012).
106. Although not a party to the case, the state did submit an amicus brief in support of the
federal position when the case went before the Federal Circuit. Amicus Curiae Brief of California
State Water Resources Control Board in Support of the United States, Casitas Mun. Water Dist.
v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2012-5033).
107. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
108. See id. at 1029.
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damage below the low water mark in connection with federal navigation
projects.109 In 2013, the CFC rejected a takings claim concerning a
riverfront property owner’s loss of deep-draft vessel access to its
commercial shipping terminal, due to the Army Corps of Engineers’
authority to revoke access to the property based on an environmental
impact statement (EIS) submitted to Congress.110 The court reasoned that
whatever property interest the claimant had was “subsumed by the federal
navigational servitude,” and decided that “[t]he economic value
attributable to a strategic riparian location is not a compensable property
interest when diminished or destroyed by the United States in aid of
navigation.”111
Just a year earlier, a judge of the same court obtained a contrasting
result. In Mehaffy v. United States, that judge considered federal claims
that the navigation servitude precluded a takings claim in a case in which
the Army Corps of Engineers denied a fill permit application under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act.112 Although the landowner held a
forty-year-old easement reserving the right to dredge and fill wetlands on
his property,113 the government argued that its “special rights in the
navigable waters of the United States curtail the scope of takings claims
that can be asserted against the United States in cases such as this.”114
The court curiously announced that “an inquiry into a compensable
109. See Amy K. Kelley, The Commerce Clause and Navigability, in 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 35.02(c) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2019) (“The navigation servitude . . . coexists with
no other enumerated power of the federal government. With regard to most navigable waters,
when the public exercises its traditional right of access, or the government exercises the navigation
power itself, an impact upon private property rights that might be compensable between private
parties, or against the government under other circumstances, will not be constitutionally
compensable under the navigation servitude.” (footnotes omitted)). The navigation servitude is
best understood as a reflection of the essential public of navigable waters, resisting attempts to
claim private rights in these waters, an antimonopolistic impulse. For an analysis of the
antimonopoly sentiments behind the related public trust doctrine, see generally Michael C.
Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine, 44 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1 (2017).
110. Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 746, 750–51, 759 (2013).
111. Id. at 756–57.
112. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86 Stat. 816, 884 (1972) (amending Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1151 (1948)); see Mehaffy v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 755, 757,
769 (2012), aff’d, 499 F. App’x 18 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
113. Mehaffy, 102 Fed. Cl. at 757–58. The court determined that rights reserved in the
easement were “not immune from being subjected to more recent regulation.” Id. at 767. The
Corps denied the permit for filling forty-eight acres of wetlands adjacent to the Arkansas River
because a lack of a disclosed purpose that made it impossible to determine that the use of the fill
would be for a water-dependent purpose, a failure to comply with local ordinances, a failure to
produce a requested hydraulic study, and the Corps’ obligations under the navigation servitude.
Id. at 759, 761, 763.
114. Id. at 763–64.
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property interest is not an analytical prerequisite” to a takings claim,
apparently rejecting Justice Scalia’s “logically antecedent inquiry,” and
proceeded to address the takings issue using the Penn Central factors.115
While dismissing the background principles defense, the CFC
nonetheless rejected the takings claim after determining that the
landowner’s right to dredge and fill his property did not inhere in his title
under the reasonable investment-backed expectations prong of the Penn
Central analysis, as he had both constructive and actual notice of the
twenty-year-old Clean Water Act permit requirements.116 In rejecting the
categorical background principles defense of the navigation servitude, the
court denied the takings claim under Penn Central balancing where the
existence of the servitude was nonetheless a primary factor.117
Two years earlier, the CFC considered the navigation servitude to be
an inherent limit on claimed riparian rights in a case involving the
government’s continuous discharge of polluted fresh water from a lake
into rivers since the 1930s, which damaged the environment of the river
in front of the riparian landowners’ home.118 The court held that the
claimants had failed to prove they held the riparian rights of which they
were allegedly deprived by the government’s action.119 Even if the
claimants could prove they held such rights, the court ruled that the
navigation servitude would bar a takings claim.120
Although the CFC has yet to establish a consistent approach to
background principles grounded on the navigation servitude, no takings
claims have succeeded in cases in which the government has defended on
115. Id. at 764 (“Without commenting on the merits of the parties' arguments, and despite
the effort spent by the parties in briefing these issues, an inquiry into a compensable property
interest is not an analytical prerequisite to ruling on defendant's motion.”).
116. See id. at 767. The court noted that “‘although a takings claim is not barred by the mere
fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction, it is particularly
difficult to establish a reasonable investment-backed expectation’ in those situations where the
party had constructive or actual knowledge of the restriction.” Id. at 765 (quoting Norman v.
United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1092–93 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
117. Id. at 764–65.
118. Mildenberger v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 217, 217, 224–25, 247 (2010), aff’d in part,
643 F.3d 938 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
119. Id. at 241 (“Although the state may convey legal title to submerged lands to private
owners, any rights thus conveyed are always subject to the state’s overriding obligation to protect
the public rights of swimming, bathing, fishing and navigation.”); see id. at 248 (“[T]he servitude
applies only to those governmental actions and projects that are related to the improvement of
navigation. . . . If a public project is wholly unrelated to navigation, the government is not shielded
from compensation liability by the federal navigational servitude.”). The court also noted that the
navigation servitude does not protect the federal government from liability for property damages
above the ordinary high water mark or from riparian damages on a non-navigable waterway. Id.
at 249.
120. Id. at 263.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3311366

24

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

that basis.
3. Customary Rights
Over thirty years ago in a decision later questioned by Justice Scalia
in a dissent from denial of certiorari,121 the Oregon Supreme Court in
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach recognized the public’s customary right
to access Oregon beaches as a background principle.122 Texas law also
recognizes public customary rights to use its beaches,123 but hurricanes
and their aftermath have complicated these public usufructuary rights. In
2012, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that even where the state has proven
a customary right to use a beach, public rights do not extend to a newly
created, post-hurricane beach if the new beach was created on previously
unencumbered private lands.124 Thus, a landowner could successfully
maintain a takings claim when the state attempted to assert public access
rights to a post-hurricane upland beach on land that previously had not
been subject to public customary rights.125
Customary rights influenced the North Carolina Court of Appeals to
reject a takings claim from landowners challenging public access to ocean
beaches adjacent to their properties.126 In denying their trespass claims,
the court explained that the landowners never had the right to exclude the
public from privately owned beaches because in North Carolina, the
public had a right to access dry-sand beaches “from time immemorial.”127
121. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211–12 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting
to denial of certiorari).
122. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1207 (1994); see Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 347–49 (discussing Stevens).
Stevens reaffirmed the Oregon Supreme Court’s landmark decision in State ex rel. Thornton v.
Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969), which recognized the public’s customary rights to use ocean
beaches. See Stevens, 854 P.2d at 456; Thornton, 462 P.2d at 676–78.
123. City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 349 (1859) (explaining that the public has a
right to use private property on seashores).
124. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. 2012) (concluding that the public’s
customary right to access the beach did not “roll” upland with the new beach if rolling onto
previously unencumbered land). The Severance court acknowledged that Texas law recognized
the public trust nature of tidelands, and that changes in tidewater can cause public trust property
to shrink or grow, but decided that landward property at issue in the case was without “historic
custom or inherent title limitations,” and thus was not subject to public use due to post-hurricane
adjustment of beaches. Id. at 708, 721, 732. The court also made clear that the state’s obligation
to prove customary use existed was a prerequisite to defending against takings claims as a
background principle. Id. at 729.
125. See id. at 732.
126. See Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 197 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
127. Id. at 195 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d) (2013)). Thus, the court concluded that
the state’s public trust doctrine protected the public’s right to drive on dry sand beaches. Id. at
198.
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4. Burial Rights
An overlooked background principle was raised in a case recently
before the Supreme Court, in which the Court reconsidered the ripeness
rule from Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank.128 Williamson County foreclosed takings claims in
federal court until a state has refused compensation,129 meaning that most
takings cases had to be filed first in state courts. In Knick v. Township of
Scott,130 a landowner challenged the requirement that she had to file her
claim first in state court, but the lower federal courts ruled against her on
ripeness grounds.131 The Supreme Court reversed on the ripeness issue,
apparently enabling takings claimants to forum shop between federal and
state reviewing courts132 But Knick’s underlying claim that her right to
exclude was taken by a Pennsylvania statute granting the public a right to
access cemeteries located on private land during daylight hours133 has
almost no chance to succeed, regardless of the forum court.
The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Knick is a commonplace statute
mirroring a longstanding common law requirement that restricted private
landowners’ ability to exclude others from accessing burial grounds.134
The common law has long recognized rights in the dead, which the living
must protect, including the right to undisturbed repose and the right of
the public to access their graves for purposes of visitation and
maintenance.135 In short, the right to access graveyards is a classic
background principle imposing an implied easement on applicable land
titles.
5. Public Necessity
A longstanding exception to compensation requirements for
128. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985) (describing the ripeness rule).
129. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 (“[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause
until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.”).
130. Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1262
(2018).
131. Id. at 314, 323.
132. See Knick v. Township of Scott, No. 17-647, 2019 WL 2552486 (June 21, 2019).
133. Knick, 862 F.3d at 314–15.
134. The common law rule and its statutory overlays are discussed in detail in a Supreme
Court amicus brief filed by cemetery law scholars in the Knick case. See Brief of Cemetery Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6–14, Knick, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (2018) (No.
17-647), 2018 WL 3740592, at *6–14.
135. See, e.g., id. at 12–17, 2018 WL 3740592, at *12–17 (discussing rights of repose and
access). See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Grave Matters: The Ancient Rights of the Graveyard,
2006 BYU L. REV. 1469 (2006) (exploring ancient rights associated with graveyards).
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governmental takings is the public necessity doctrine, which is the idea
that public rights trump private rights, without compensation, in
emergencies.136 The Supreme Court has stated that “the common law had
long recognized” the government’s authority to respond to “imminent
peril—such as when fire threatened a whole community,” even if the
response involved “destroy[ing] the property of a few” to save lives and
the property of the many.137 Justice Scalia recognized public necessity
as a background principle in Lucas.138
Although the public necessity defense has broader application,139 one
court recently applied it in a public nuisance abatement action for a
property owner’s failure to remove junk vehicles from his yard, noting
that under settled doctrine, a state “may take, damage, or destroy private
property without compensation, when the public necessity, the public
health, or the public safety require it to be done.”140 The sparse, recent
case law should not be interpreted as a harbinger of the invocation of the
public necessity defense, especially in a future where climate change is
likely to bring increased risks of flood and fire.
B. Nuisance
Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion rejected statutory nuisances as
categorical, per se defenses to takings claims, but it nonetheless provided
examples of nuisances that would equip the government with viable
nuisance defenses. The opinion stated that denying a permit for a fill to
prevent flooding of nearby land or an order to remove a nuclear plant
upon discovery of earthquake fault would not result in a taking.141 This

136. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Move Away from the Absolute Dominion Rule, in 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 20.06 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2019) (“The emergency doctrine
basically is that where a situation ensures that some private property must be destroyed regardless
of the decisions the government makes, it can choose which forms of property should be destroyed
without having to pay compensation.”).
137. United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952).
138. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (“The principal ‘otherwise’
that we have in mind is litigation absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the
destruction of ‘real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of
a fire’ to forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of others.” (quoting Bowditch v.
City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1880))).
139. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Drought and Public Necessity: Can a Common-Law
“Stick” Increase Flexibility in Western Water Law?, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 77, 92–99 (2018)
(discussing the public necessity doctrine and its potential application to drought).
140. Ashe v. City of Montgomery, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1313, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2010)
(quoting Hulen v. City of Corsicana, 65 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1933)).
141. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (“[T]he owner of a lakebed, for example, would not be
entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation
that would have the effect of flooding others' land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating
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suggested that new regulations, such as common law nuisance,142 could
respond to new circumstances or “new knowledge” without paying
compensation.143 Presumably, Justice Scalia was satisfied that these
situations were remediable under common law nuisance principles long
recognized to have sufficient elasticity to respond to new information.144
In 2018, a lower New York court concluded that the state’s nuisance
law did not forbid wetland fills. From the early nineteenth century until
the 1970s, it was “longstanding practice and part of the common history
of the City of New York” to fill wetlands for development, and thus state
wetland regulations restricting fills could not be background
principles.145 However, a 2016 New York appeals court decision rejected
a landowner’s contention that a background principles nuisance had to be
recognized as a nuisance when a regulation was promulgated, observing
that nuisance law was not static.146
According to the CFC, operating a landfill is not a nuisance in the state
of Washington because a Washington statute specifically authorizes
landfills; this in turn makes the background principles defense
inapplicable.147 The same court ruled that a federal order to dispose of
plant, when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant
sits astride an earthquake fault.”).
142. There is a long history of common law nuisance responding to changed circumstances
and new information. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 74 (1st ed. 1977) (suggesting that American courts became willing to
“accommodate the law of nuisance to the demands of a developing society” around the time of
the Civil War); Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses From an Old Manse: Another Look at Some
Historic Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 821 (1979) (“In 1894,
Professor John T. Dillon of Yale predicted that American property law would see ‘important
changes of substance and form’ as it adapted to the new values in American society.
Appropriately, the res communes doctrine, one of property law’s oldest elements, may assist in
this change.” (footnote omitted) (quoting J. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND
AND AMERICA 385 (1894))).
143. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
144. See, e.g., Andrea L. Peterson, The False Dichotomy Between Physical and Regulatory
Takings Analysis: A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra’s Distinction Between Physical and Regulatory
Takings, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 435–36 n.210 (2007) (explaining that in Tahoe-Sierra, “new
information” learned about the potential environmental harm of developing near Lake Tahoe
allowed the government to exercise its police power to prevent that alleged nuisance from
occurring); Joseph L. Sax, Reflections on Western Water Law, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 299, 303 (2007)
(suggesting takings claimants may be victims of changing circumstances as new information is
learned that authorizes the government to abate nuisances without incurring takings liability).
145. In re City of New York, No. (CY) 4018/07, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 51, at *11 (Sup.
Ct. Jan. 12, 2018); see infra note 156 and accompanying text.
146. Monroe Equities, LLC v. State, 43 N.Y.S.3d 103, 106 (App. Div. 2016) (“Resolution
of the instant claim does not rely upon application of a blanket rule. As discussed above, the record
establishes that the right to install a septic system was never part of the bundle of rights acquired
by the claimant.”).
147. See Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 479 (2009).
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uninfected breeder chickens, as part of a disease-eradication program,
was not justified as nuisance-prevention because California law
considered only infected chickens to be nuisances. 148 The CFC
determined that denial of wetland permits in connection with a sewer
project in Minnesota insulated both the state and federal governments
from takings liability on nuisance-prevention grounds. It simultaneously
suggested, however, that alternative proposed sewer projects might
not.149
In 2014, a federal district court decided that a North Carolina town
order prohibiting the repair of a beachfront cottage and requiring its
removal after a hurricane was not a physical taking.150 Nonetheless, the
court refused to dismiss the landowner’s regulatory takings claim,
suggesting that the record did not indicate that a house in need of repair
would constitute a nuisance under North Carolina law, since thousands
of similar houses in the state are located on dry-sand beaches.151
These cases suggest that if the government exercises its police power
to abate or prevent nuisances, courts will likely find that takings claimants
never held a property interest in an allegedly taken land use under
background principles of state nuisance law.
IV. STATUTORY BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES IN THE
LOWER COURTS
As indicated above, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lucas
maintained that background principles could include statutes,152

148. Cebe Farms, Inc. v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 179, 201–02 (2014). In another CFC
decision, the court decided that controlled burns by the U.S. Forest Service were not a physical
taking of private reality because of the agency’s power to prevent nuisances, like measures to
prevent large-scale wildfires. TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 98, 102 (2012), rev’d,
722 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013). But the Federal Circuit reversed without addressing the nuisance
issue or background principles. See Trinco Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
149. Bailey v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 310, 312–13, 321 (2014) (involving revocation of
a state water quality certification and denial of a federal permit under § 404 of the Clean Water
Act to develop property for residences).
150. Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, No. 2:11-CV-1-D, 2014 WL 4219516, at *3, *5 (E.D.
N.C. Aug. 18, 2014).
151. Id. at *16.
152. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring in
the judgment) (“The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in
response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever
their source. The Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law; it protects
private expectations to ensure private investment. I agree with the Court that nuisance prevention
accords with the most common expectations of property owners who face regulation, but I do not
believe this can be the sole source of state authority to impose severe restrictions.”).
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something Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did not acknowledge.153
Over the last quarter-century, both the Supreme Court and lower courts
have largely embraced Justice Kennedy’s perspective, although they have
not agreed with how long a statute must exist for it to become a
background principle.154
A wide variety of recent case law has recognized statutes as
background principles. These decisions have considered whether wetland
regulations, setback requirements, public ownership of wildlife and
water, homestead exemptions, flood control limits, state environmental
impact assessment requirements, public mining rights, and zoning
restrictions qualify as background principles. Some of these measures
have proved not to be background principles because of their relatively
recent vintage.155 This Part surveys recent cases concerning statutory
background principles.
A. Wetland Regulations
In 2018, a New York trial court rejected a claim that state wetland
regulations, dating from 1975, were background principles of state law,
reasoning that that “prohibitions on filling and developing wetlands were
never a traditional part of New York property law”; instead, the court
claimed it was “longstanding practice and part of the common history of
the City of New York” to fill wetlands, as they were viewed as
impediments to development.156 Thus, the court concluded, “it is clear
the New York State wetlands regulations did not simply make explicit a
prohibition on activity that ‘was always unlawful’, [sic] and therefore the
wetland regulations are not background principles of New York property
153. See id. at 1029 (majority opinion).
154. See, e.g., Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2011); Monroe Equities,
LLC v. State, 43 N.Y.S.3d 103, 106 (App. Div. 2016).
155. Arguably, the age of a regulation should not be the exclusive determinative of its status
as a background principle. Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion suggested that new information, like
knowledge of an earthquake fault, could be the basis of a background principle. See Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1029, 1031 (“[C]hanged circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so.” (citation omitted)); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
628 (2001) (rejecting a “blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right”
because such a rule would suggest that new information may require compensation in some
circumstances and not in others); id. at 633–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that “the
regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue” shapes the
reasonableness of expectations, suggesting that both the age of a regulation and the public purpose
it serves are relevant factors in deciding whether it is a background principle for takings purposes).
156. In re City of New York, No. (CY) 4018/07, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 51, at *11 (Sup.
Ct. Jan. 12, 2018). The court decided that the 1975 regulations, recognizing the environmental
importance of wetlands and restricting their development, marked “an abrupt reversal in the
treatment of wetlands and constituted a distinct change in the legal rights of owners of wetlands.”
Id. at *12–13.
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law.”157 The insufficient 1975 vintage of the New York wetlands
regulation seems inconsistent with the 1975 merger regulation on which
the Supreme Court relied in Murr.158
B. Shoreline Setback Requirements
Wetland regulations may not be background principles in New York,
but setback regulations from lakebeds are—at least those that are eightyfive years old at the time of property acquisition.159 The New York
Appellate Division rejected a property owner’s allegation that to
constitute a background principle, a state setback requirement had to
prohibit an activity that New York courts recognized as a nuisance at the
time the requirement was promulgated in 1920.160 Although the Court of
Claims of New York acknowledged that a takings claimant “bears a
heavy burden of proving each and every element of the claim[,] including
the basic, ‘antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate,’” the
court ruled that a background principles nuisance defense was not static
and not measured by the nuisance doctrine at the time a regulation was
promulgated.161 Consequently, the court decided that the setback
requirement was a background principle and took no recognized
compensable property right.162
C. Public Ownership of Wildlife
Nearly all states declare they own the wildlife within their borders.163
This public ownership enables state agencies to permit or license
activities without conferring property rights.164 In short, wildlife harvests
are conducted subject to revocable state conditions, which are in effect
background principles.165 For example, permittees and lessees of

157. Id. at *13.
158. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Monroe Equities, 43 N.Y.S.3d at 106.
160. See id. The claimant in this case purchased the property at issue in 2005. Id. at 104.
161. Monroe Equities LLC v. State, 4 N.Y.S.3d 816, 825 (Ct. Cl. 2014), aff’d, 43 N.Y.S.3d
103 (App. Div. 2016).
162. Id. at 822 (“[N]othing was taken from claimant to which he had an ‘of right’ entitlement
at the time of purchase.”).
163. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L.
REV. 1437, 1488–1504 (2013) (listing state constitutional, statutory, and case law as sources of
public ownership of wildlife).
164. See Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining such state
action in Alaska).
165. See Hecht, supra note 51, at 785 (“[A] background limitation on property rights can
coexist with a license or other mechanism that allows particular conduct provisionally, but does
not confer a property right to continue it. . . . ‘[T]he only essential element of a background
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commercial salmon harvesting rights in Alaska have no cognizable claim
against the state for shortening the season or limiting the catch, according
to a recent Ninth Circuit interpretation of Alaska statutes.166 Describing
permits as licenses, and leases as use privileges on submerged lands that
the state may revoke or modify without compensation, the Ninth Circuit
seemed to imply that the fishing statutes are background principles that
inhere in the holder’s usufructuary interests and consequently
categorically bar takings claims.167 The result was quite consistent with a
decision of the Federal Circuit several years earlier, which decided that
federal fishing restrictions in the exclusive economic zone were
background principles inhering in a fishing vessel’s title, and therefore
denied a regulatory takings claim.168
The Supreme Court’s discussion of oysters as public property in
Horne, discussed above, 169 recognized public wildlife ownership as
sufficient to defeat a takings claim; thus, the Alaska result is hardly
unusual. A recent Oregon case is typical. In upholding a criminal
conviction for shooting deer, the Oregon Supreme Court confirmed that
the state owns wildlife in a sovereign capacity in trust for the public.170
The court’s reasoning reinforced the background principle of public
ownership of wildlife precluding a private landowner’s takings claim.171
principle for takings purposes is that it excludes a claim of entitlement.’” (quoting Echeverria,
supra note 94, at 950)).
166. See Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 966–67 (9th Cir. 2011).
167. See id. at 961, 966 (rejecting the First Circuit’s approach in Hoffman v. City of Warwick,
909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990), which suggested that federal takings law, not state property law,
defines the nature of a property right).
168. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., LP v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(noting that at the time the owner purchased the vessel, the Magunsen Fishery Conservation and
Management Act was a background principle of federal law that inhered in the vessel’s title,
precluding any harvester from possessing a property right to fish on the ocean).
169. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
170. State v. Dickerson, 345 P.3d 447, 448, 453–54 (Or. 2015) (relying on State v. Hume, 95
P. 808 (Or. 1908), among other cases).
171. See id. at 455 (“[N]o person has an absolute property right in game or fish while in a
state of nature and at large . . . the taking of them is not a right, but is a privilege, which may be
restricted, prohibited, or conditioned, as the law-making power may see fit.” (alterations in
original) (quoting State v. Pulos, 129 P. 128 (Or. 1913)). Federal wildlife regulations produce
similar results. Although the decisions do not explicitly reference background principles, their
reasoning is consistent with the background principles defense. For example, in Mountain States
Legal Found. v. Hodel, the court rejected ranchers’ claims that wild horse herds, protected by
federal law, took their property when the horses consumed grasslands on checkerboarded federal
and private lands in Wyoming. 799 F.2d 1423, 1430–31 (10th Cir. 1986). The ranchers’ alleged
that the effect of government protection of the horses amounted to a permanent government
occupation of private grasslands, on the basis of “an unbroken line of cases” in which the Supreme
Court has sustained government regulation of wildlife like wild horses despite reductions,
sometimes severe, in the value of affected private property. Id. at 1429–30; see also Colvin Cattle
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D. Public Ownership of Water
As in the case of wildlife, most states—especially in the West—claim
to own the water within their borders.172 This public ownership should
operate as a barrier to successful takings claims against regulatory
restrictions on the water use of rights holders. But the case law, especially
from the CFC, is more complicated.
In Hill v. State, surface water rights holders in Nebraska claimed that
state-imposed restrictions on their diversions beginning in 2013 to fulfill
the obligations under a 1943 interstate compact between Nebraska,
Kansas, and Colorado amounted to a taking of their vested prior
appropriation rights.173 The Nebraska Supreme Court decided otherwise,
concluding that there was no taking because the scope of a property right
in water is only for a “beneficial use” and that such a use is subject to the
state’s obligations under the Republican River Compact.174 The court
declared that “[n]o compensation is owed in a takings claim if the State’s
affirmative decree simply makes explicit what already inheres in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”175
Consequently, the state-imposed condition of “beneficial use” on water
rights holders, combined with the state’s obligation to comply with
interstate compacts, amount to background principles—even if the
compact is later in time than the affected water rights.176

Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 808–09 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding no takings due to federal
government’s failure to prevent wild horses from interfering with a rancher’s state water rights);
Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334–35 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no takings due to federal
protection of grizzly bears that preyed on a rancher’s livestock); Chittenden v. United States, 126
Fed. Cl. 251, 264 (2016) (reasoning that the installation of “bat gates” by the U.S. Forest Service
was not a takings of mining rights because of the agency’s statutory authority to protect wildlife
and public safety).
172. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust,
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 57 (2010) (“[I]n almost all prior appropriation states, state water law
includes a declaration, constitutional or statutory, that the state or the public owns the fresh water
itself. . . . For public trust purposes, therefore, such declarations leave western states free to
impress waters with public trust protections entirely independently of state ownership of the beds
and banks of navigable waters, extending many state public trust doctrines to non-navigable
waters.”).
173. Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208, 211–12, 215 (Neb. 2017).
174. 1943 Neb. Laws 377 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 1-106 (2018)); Hill,
894 N.W.2d at 217–19, 221.
175. Hill, 894 N.W.2d at 215.
176. See id. at 215–16 (“[T]he apportionment made by the [c]ompact cannot have taken . . .
any vested right. . . . [T]he apportionment is binding upon the citizens of each State and all water
claimants, even where the State had granted the water rights before it entered into the compact”
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The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected a similar takings claim in an
ensuing case concerning the same compact. After recognizing that “a
takings analysis begins with an examination of the nature of the owner’s
property interest,” the court observed in Cappel v. State Department of
Natural Resources that water is a public resource in the state.177
Consequently, irrigation water rights are limited by the state’s
requirement that the water be used for a “beneficial use” and subject to
reasonable subsequent regulations.178 The court therefore concluded that
the water rights holders “have not pled a physical or regulatory taking of
private property.”179
Takings claims against the federal government for over $10,000 lie in
the CFC.180 In recent years, the CFC has staked out a unique position
concerning takings claims involving water rights and background
principles. Nearly two decades ago, in Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District v. United States, the court, per Judge Paul Wiese, announced that
temporary restrictions imposed by the Bureau of Reclamation to carry out
its obligations under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to protect
endangered delta smelt and winter chinook salmon during a drought
amounted to a physical, per se taking.181 The court decided that the ESA
restrictions amounted to a permanent physical occupation of the state
water rights of irrigation districts with federal water delivery contracts.182
Tulare Lake also rejected federal arguments that the state’s PTD was a
background principle that barred the claim.183
Although Judge Wiese recognized that under California law the PTD
was in fact a background principle that could prohibit inconsistent water
diversions,184 he decided that any implementation of the doctrine against
a diverter as a background principle had to come from the state water
(second and third alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Hinderlider v. La Plata River
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106, 108 (1938))).
177. Cappel v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 905 N.W.2d 38, 46, 48 (Neb. 2017) (“Water in
Nebraska is a public resource dedicated for certain uses.”).
178. Id. at 48–49.
179. Id.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). CFC decisions are appealable to the Federal Circuit. See, e.g.,
Stearns Co. v. United States, 396 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
181. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314, 319
(2001).
182. Id. at 319 (“To the extent, then, that the federal government, by preventing plaintiffs
from using the water to which they would otherwise have been entitled, have rendered the
usufructuary right to that water valueless, they have thus effected a physical taking.”).
183. Id. at 320–24.
184. Id. at 321 (“[P]laintiffs have no right to use or divert water . . . in a way that violates the
public trust.”). The California Supreme Court made clear that the PTD applied to state water rights
in its Mono Lake decision. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983)
(en banc).
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board or a state court, not from a CFC judge.185 Why a federal court could
not interpret state law was left unclear, although Judge Wiese cited the
PTD’s “complex balancing of interests.”186 Yet in an earlier decision,
Judge Wiese invoked nuisance balancing in applying background
principles to deny a regulatory takings claim of a mining company.187
The Tulare Lake decision earned some withering criticism,188 and
Judge Wiese later decided he had erred in concluding that water diversion
restrictions were physical, per se takings after the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Tahoe-Sierra case,189 in which the Court described per se
takings as narrow exceptions to the generic balancing paradigm
established in Penn Central.190 Somewhat astonishingly, rather than
appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit, the Bush Administration chose
to pay some $26 million in compensation.191 One CFC judge later
suggested that the Tulare Lake diverters obtained compensation “for the
taking of interests that may well not exist under state law.”192
In a subsequent decision, the Federal Circuit declined to embrace
Judge Wiese’s revised view that the alleged takings of the right to
beneficial use should be evaluated as regulatory takings. On the peculiar

185. Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 323–24 (stating that enforcement of PTD is “committed to”
the state agency and courts, while the CFC “is not suited and with which it is not charged” to
implement the state’s PTD). Judge Wiese claimed that the CFC could apply the PTD as a
background principle only when the doctrine functioned as a “single, discrete resolution.” Id. at
323.
186. Id. at 323.
187. See Rith Energy v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 115 (1999), aff’d, 247 F.3d 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
188. See, e.g., Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered
Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 551 (2002); John D. Echeverria, Is
Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579, 594–98 (2010).
189. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 105–06 (2007), rev’d,
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (2008).
190. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323–27
(2002). The Court justified the categorical, per se rule for physical takings on the ground that they
were “relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual
property rights.” Id. at 324. The Court also instructed lower courts that the “temptation to adopt
what amount to per se rules . . . must be resisted.” Id. at 342 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
191. See Echeverria, supra note 188, at 581 n.14.
192. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 (2005) (explaining that
Tulare Lake “appears to be wrong on some counts, incomplete in others and, distinguishable, at
all events”); see also Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 132 (Ct. App.
2006) (“The [decision’s] reasoning is flawed because in that case the government’s passive
restriction, which required the water users to leave water in the stream, did not constitute a
physical invasion or appropriation . . . . Tulare Lake’s reasoning disregards the hallmarks of a
categorical physical taking . . . .” (citations omitted)).
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facts of Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States,193 which
involved more than a governmental restriction on water diversions—
specifically, a physical diversion of water from the district’s irrigation
canal into a fish ladder to protect to endangered steelhead trout—the
Federal Circuit said that a physical takings analysis did apply.194 The
court reached this conclusion in part due to the arguably mistaken notion
that the district owned the water in the irrigation canal.195 The case’s
distinctive facts and the decision’s misunderstanding of California water
law make Casitas an unreliable precedent. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly refused to apply it in other water rights takings cases. 196
Neither the Tulare Lake nor Casitas court prefaced its consideration
of whether water rights restrictions for species preservation were takings
on the “logically antecedent inquiry” of whether state law foreclosed the
takings claims. The Tulare Lake decision did, however, suggest that
resolving this issue was a matter for state officials.197 The Federal Circuit
clarified the role of background principles in water rights takings claims
in a pending case also involving restrictions imposed on water diverters
to preserve endangered species. In Baley v. United States,198 the CFC
decided that there was no taking concerning Bureau of Reclamationimposed restrictions to preserve three endangered species of fish due to
the background principle of the prior federal reserved water rights of the

193. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
194. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The fish ladder was a requirement imposed
upon the district by the federal biological consultation process of the ESA. Casitas, 543 F.3d at
1301.
195. See Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1286–87. Water in California is publicly owned. CAL. WATER
CODE § 102 (West 2018) (“All water within the State is the property of the people of the State,
but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner provided by
law.”). Water rights holders have only a usufruct, a use right in the water, one that is quite
conditional: requiring consistency with the requirements of both the beneficial use and public trust
doctrines. CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2018) (“The right to water or to the use or flow of water
in or from any natural stream or watercourse in this State is and shall be limited to such water as
shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall
not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable
method of diversion of water.”).
196. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist., 67 Fed. Cl. at 538; see also, e.g., Estate of Hage v.
United States, 685 F. App’x 927, 932 (Fed. Cir.) (noting that where the government restricts use
of property, instead of occupying it, no physical taking occurs), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 479
(2017); Mildenberger v. United States, 643 F.3d 938, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a physical
takings claim involving water quality concerns); CRV Enters. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241,
1247 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that there is no Supreme Court “hold[ing] that a physical taking
of water rights occurs merely when a particular use of the water is restricted”).
197. See supra note 184–185 and accompanying text.
198. 134 Fed. Cl. 619 (2017).
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Klamath Tribes.199 If the Federal Circuit affirms the CFC, it will clarify
that antecedent to any takings evaluation—whether based on physical or
regulatory takings principles—is an analysis of the nature of the property
right in water the claimant actually possesses: a background principles
inquiry.200
E. Flood Control Requirements
In the wake of Hurricane Harvey in 2017, a number of Texas property
owners claimed that federal dams operated by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers caused flooding that in turn effected an alleged taking of their
property.201 The CFC agreed. The court in In re Upstream Addicks &
Barker (Texas) Flood-Control Reservoirs rejected the federal
government’s background principles defenses and concluded that neither
the Texas Water Code202 nor the federal Flood Control Act of 1928203
was a background principle foreclosing the takings claims.204 However,
the court’s reasoning was thin; it decided that the mere passage of a
statute prior to a government action does not inherently become a
background principle precluding a property owner of a judicial remedy.
Moreover, the court made no effort to distinguish other decisions
suggesting just that.205
F. Homestead Exemptions
In 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ruled that a 150-year-old New York homestead exemption, as applied to
a creditor’s judgment lien against a debtor, qualified as a background
principle of New York property law, inhering in the creditor’s property
interest in the lien.206 The same decision ruled that a federal lien199. Id. at 625, 668, 679–80 (deciding that the challenged water rights restrictions did not
constitute a taking because Baley’s water rights were subject to more senior water rights held by
the Klamath Tribes).
200. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 1046–47 (1992) (explaining
that even categorical takings were subject to the antecedent background principles inquiry). In
Baley, commercial fishermen argued that a background principle—public ownership of fish and
wildlife in Oregon—prevented any takings of water rights. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Pacific
Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations at 27–29, Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. 619 (2017) (Nos. 18–
1323, 18–1325) (arguing that the background principle of public ownership should preclude a
takings claim).
201. In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Texas) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl.
658, 661–62 (2018).
202. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.086 (West 2017).
203. 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2012).
204. In re Upstream Addicks & Barker, 138 Fed. Cl. at 668.
205. Id.; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
206. 1256 Hertel Ave. Assocs. v. Calloway, 761 F.3d 252, 266–67 (2d Cir. 2014).
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avoidance provision, entitling individual debtors to avoid liens on certain
types of property, was not a background principle, as it was only enacted
in the 1970s.207 On the other hand, an Ohio court recently concluded that
a state homestead exemption was a background principle of state law, as
it was over 160 years old.208
G. Public Land Mining Rights
In 2012, the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) withdrew
over a million acres of public lands from entry and exploration under the
federal mining law for twenty years to protect the Grand Canyon
watershed.209 Vane Minerals had over 600 mining claims within the
withdrawn area that, due to the withdrawal, it could not enter or explore
absent a federal BLM determination of prior “valid existing rights”
(VER).210 The company filed suit, claiming that the withdrawal was a
taking of its mining rights. But the CFC ruled that Vane’s federal property
right depended on a finding that it had discovered a valuable mineral,
which in turn required a VER determination at the time of the
withdrawal.211 Because the company lacked such a determination, it
could not show a property interest sufficient to prevail in a takings suit.212
As a result, the ruling effectively treated the requirements of the federal
mining law as a background principle of federal law.213
H. State Environmental Impact Statement Requirements
In 2016, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
decided that the state’s EIS requirement prior to large land developments
207. See id. at 266. The rejection of the lien-avoidance provision reinforced the notion that
wetland regulations promulgated in the 1970s were not background principles, at least in New
York. See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 169–74 (1973); supra note 145 and accompanying text.
208. In re Davis, 539 B.R. 334, 349 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015) (noting that a homestead
exemption defines the scope of a lienholder’s property interest in investment-backed
expectations).
209. Public Land Order No. 7787, 77 Fed. Reg. 2563, 2563 (Jan. 18, 2012). The Federal
Land Policy and Management Act authorizes such withdrawals, subject to specified procedures,
including sending to Congress a report explaining the reasons for the withdrawal, its
environmental and economic effects, alternatives evaluated, the extent to which the public and
other agencies were consulted, and detailed information on the geology and future mineral
potential of the area. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2) (2012).
210. Vane Minerals (US), LLC v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 48, 52–53 (2014).
211. Id. at 61–62.
212. Id. at 63.
213. The Supreme Court has described federal mining rights as a “unique form of property,”
which puts miners on notice of both the federal government’s land ownership and its substantial
regulatory authority. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335 (1963); see United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985).
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was not a background principle of state law.214 The court rejected the state
land use commission’s position that a landowner’s failure to obtain an
EIS precluded a takings claim. The court instead decided that the
requirement “is not a prohibition on land use based on principles of
nuisance or property law,” as it “merely requires that an owner seek an
assessment of the proposed use’s potential environmental impact.”215 As
a result, the court concluded that the failure to obtain an EIS did not
preclude a landowner’s takings claim for the reclassification of urban use
of land to agricultural use.216
I. Zoning Restrictions
An ocean-bordering county’s 2014 imposition of a 150-foot marine
buffer zone restricting shoreline developments to mitigate environmental
damage associated with coastal flooding was not a taking, according to
the Washington Court of Appeals in Olympic Stewardship Foundation v.
Washington Environment & Land Use Hearings Office.217 The court
decided that even though single-family homes are a priority use under
state law, the county had the authority to restrict development to further
ecological goals and, “[i]n fact,” development was permissible “only if
[it would] result in no net loss of shoreline ecological functions and
systems.”218
Although the Washington court did not explicitly mention background
principles, it seemed to reject a takings claim under that premise when it
stated, “[T]he responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations . . . ha[ve] a fundamental and
inalienable right to a healthful environment and that each person has a
responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment.”219 This result was completely contrary to the federal
court’s interpretation of Hawaii’s EIS requirement.220
A more direct invocation of background principles occurred in a case
involving a re-zoning of residential property back to commercial property
214. See Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Haw. Land Use Comm’n, No. 11-00414 SOM-BMK,
2016 WL 797567, at *9 (D. Haw. Feb. 29, 2016).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Olympic Stewardship Found. v. Wash. Envtl. & Land Use Hearings Office, 399 P.3d
562, 567, 572, 574–76, 585–86, 599 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). The buffer zone was to fulfill the
requirements of the state Shoreline Management Act of 1971. Id. at 567–69.
218. Id. at 572 (interpreting the state’s Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 90.58.010–.920 (2018)).
219. See id. at 571–72 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE. § 43.21C.020).
220. See Bridge Aina Le’a, 2016 WL 797567, at *9 (concluding an EIS is not a background
principle).
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located in Thibodaux, Louisiana.221 The applicants seeking the rezoning
challenged its denial, but the state court of appeals decided that, because
the rezoning took place in 1979 and was not for a malicious or improper
purpose, “it is a background principle that is a defense to recovery of
damages under Louisiana’s takings law.”222 Louisiana courts thus appear
more willing to consider statutes or regulations to be background
principles that are less than a half-century old than are New York
courts.223 The twenty-five-year period recognized in this decision is
similar to the Wisconsin merger provision that the United States Supreme
Court upheld in Murr.224
This survey of recent case law reveals that background principles
remain a critical first inquiry that takings claimants must successfully
hurdle to succeed in takings cases. This is true regardless of whether the
challenge is to state wetland, water, shoreline, or zoning restrictions, as
well as to wildlife regulations, homestead exemptions, or federal mining
limitations.
V. APPLYING BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES TO PENN CENTRAL AND
PHYSICAL TAKINGS CASES
The Lucas case established the government’s background principles
defense in the context of a regulation depriving a landowner of all
economic value.225 There remained some question as to whether
background principles could be a defense in cases not involving
economic wipeouts; that is, in Penn Central-type takings and
governmental physical appropriations or occupations. The early results
indicated that the background principles defense was not limited to
economic wipeouts.226 These results were only logical, as Justice Scalia
described the background principles defense as the “logically antecedent”
inquiry into any claimant’s alleged property rights.227 There seems to be
no good reason why such a prerequisite inquiry into property rights
should be limited to regulations alleging complete economic wipeouts.
Recent cases confirm this admonition, although not without revealing
some complications.

221. See E. First St., LLC v. Bd. of Adjustments, No. 2007 CA 0664, 2008 WL 2567080, at
*1 (La. Ct. App. June 6, 2008).
222. Id. at *5.
223. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
226. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 13, at 326 nn.27–28 (citing physical occupation and
Penn Central-type takings cases decided prior to 2005).
227. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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A. Penn Central Takings
As indicated above, at least one CFC judge rejected a categorical
background principles defense and proceeded to engage in contextual
Penn Central balancing, deciding that an antecedent inquiry into the
claimant’s property interest was unnecessary.228 That was an exceptional
result, as most courts considering the issue assumed that Lucas’s
“antecedent inquiry” is a prerequisite to any successful takings claim. For
example, the Ninth Circuit interpreted an Alaska limit on fishing leases
and permits to amount to a background principle that foreclosed a takings
claim.229 Similarly, federal mining law proved to be a background
principle concerning mining on public lands: Without complying with the
prerequisites of a federal property right to mine, the claimant had no
viable takings case concerning the government’s withdrawal of
permissible mining entry on lands adjacent to the Grand Canyon.230
B. Physical Takings
The Supreme Court has issued several decisions finding takings for
permanent physical occupations, beginning with a small TV cable wire
in Manhattan several decades ago.231 Recently, the Court found a physical
taking of personal property in connection with a government “raisin
reserve” program aimed at maintaining market prices.232 Lower courts
have applied background principles in physical takings cases, although
the CFC has again created some confusion, particularly in the context of
alleged water rights takings.
Both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme
Court have employed the background principles analysis in beach access
228. See Mehaffy v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 755, 764 (2012), aff’d, 499 F. App’x 18
(2012). For discussion of this case see supra notes 112–117 and accompanying text. Judge Miller
explained that wetland fill permit denial cases are “almost always one of a regulatory taking,” and
consequently maintained that “courts should proceed directly to the Penn Central factor analysis
unless there has been . . . a categorical (regulatory) taking such as that present in Lucas.” Id. at
764. The implication was that the court would engage in Penn Central balancing without inquiry
into the nature of the property interest of the claimant, in apparent contradiction to Justice Scalia’s
admonition. There were no other recent examples of this reluctance to treat background principles
as an antecedent inquiry.
229. See Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 969 (9th Cir. 2011). For discussion of this case
see supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
230. See Vane Minerals (US), LLC v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 48, 58–59 (2014).
231. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430 (1982)
(“[P]ermanent occupations of land . . . are takings even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial
amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner’s use of the rest of his land.”).
232. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. (Horne II), 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424, 2426–27, 2431 (2015)
(discounting any distinction between personal and real property in takings jurisprudence); see also
supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
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cases, despite claims that public access amounted to physical takings.233
Likewise, the Nebraska Supreme Court thought that an interstate compact
was a background principle, despite a claimed physical taking of prior
appropriation water rights.234 Similarly, the CFC determined that
government-induced flooding of riparian land and degradation of
waterways in Florida, which occurred when the government discharged
water from Lake Okeechobee into the St. Lucie River to avoid flooding,
was not a taking due the background principle of the federal navigation
servitude.235
All of these decisions involved applications of background principles
to alleged physical takings, which is no surprise given the reasoning of
Lucas.236 Yet, the CFC decided that a restriction imposed on water rights
to protect endangered species did not qualify as a background principle,
after discounting the effects of state limitations on the scope of water use
imposed by the PTD and the concept of beneficial use—two background
principles.237 A subsequent CFC water rights decision turned on the
background principle of prior Indian water rights, with the court
concluding that these rights foreclosed the takings claim.238
This review of recent case law confirms that an inquiry into
background principles is the antecedent inquiry concerning alleged
physical invasions, just as it is for Penn Central regulatory takings.
CONCLUSION
Background principles of property and nuisance law are bedrock
principles of Anglo-American law. No takings claimant has a right to
233. See generally Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015)
(finding no taking due to ordinance recognizing public access); Severance v. Patterson, 370
S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012) (refusing to recognize a “rolling” public easement in the wake of a
hurricane); supra notes 96–98, 124–125, 126–127 and accompanying text.
234. See Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208, 214, 218–19 (Neb. 2017) (suggesting that compactimposed restrictions were background principles, affecting even senior water rights); supra notes
174–176 and accompanying text.
235. See Mildenberger v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 217, 255 (2010), aff’d in part, 643 F.3d
938 (2011). A federal decision to install a sand cap and log boom as part of a Superfund
remediation project to prevent navigation and dredging from stirring up sediment that contained
hazardous chemicals, including carcinogens, did not, according to the Federal Circuit, amount to
a physical taking. CRV Enters. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1244, 1246, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
2010). The court reasoned that the claimants had never held the property rights that were allegedly
taken because the government action predated the acquisition of those rights. Id. at 1250.
236. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining how Justice Scalia equated
economic wipeouts with physical occupations).
237. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 455–58, 461 (2011),
aff’d, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text.
238. See Baley v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 680 (2017); supra notes 26, 199–200 and
accompanying text.
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government compensation absent a showing that its claimed property
right is in fact a verifiable and vested one.239 This is the “logically
antecedent inquiry” that Justice Scalia sketched in Lucas,240 although the
defense was recognized by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes over a century
earlier.241 The defense requires an evaluation of relevant state and federal
law bearing on the claimant’s asserted property interest.
The background principles defense resembles the old categorical
government nuisance-prevention defense, which the Lucas majority
rejected.242 The effect of replacing the noxious use defense with the
background principles defense was, however, hardly revolutionary:
simply obligating government defendants to do more than merely claim
that an activity was harmful and requiring that a regulation be anchored
in common law or longstanding statutory law. The result was not
insignificant to litigators, since it imposed a burden of proof on the
government’s defense of regulations. Because most of these laws will be
state laws, there could be some tension between state court interpretations
of state background principles and federal court interpretations of the
Fifth Amendment.243 But there should be little federal court intervention,
since states usually determine the nature of the private property rights
protected by the compensation promise of the Constitution, and federal
courts are not experts in state laws.
This Article’s review of recent case law has uncovered many more
statutory background principles than common law principles. Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Lucas has apparently triumphed. The cases do
not reveal how old a statutory provision must be to qualify as a
background principle, but there is evidence to suggest that forty years is
sufficient.244 The vintage of the statute, however, was only one variable
239. See Echeverria, supra note 93, at 944 (explaining that although the Court had recognized that
a vested right was a precondition for a successful takings claim in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160–61 (1980), the Lucas decision caused the Court to define with
greater particularity the nature of a vested, and therefore compensable, property interest).
240. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
241. See Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
242. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text. The origins
of the “noxious use” defense are traceable to Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“But restriction imposed to protect
the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in
question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use.”).
243. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land
Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 473 (2000) (“[W]hen the Takings Clause is applied to local
land use regulation, it must be tempered with a concern for federalism.”); Andrew W. Schwartz,
No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Justifies Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 294 (2015) (“Federal court review of local and state regulation of property
use . . . is inconsistent with principles of federalism embodied in the federal Constitution.”).
244. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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of the government defense that Justice Scalia recognized in Lucas, as
Justice Scalia also acknowledged the severity of adverse effects on public
resources.245 So, future cases may emphasize not merely the age of the
statute but also its public importance and perhaps its relationship to
longstanding common law principles.
Background principles are likely to lead to a vibrant takings law
jurisprudence in the years ahead. Because the property rights determined
by the background principles of law are the antecedent inquiry to whether
a regulation has taken private property, government defendants will
assuredly raise the background principles defense at the outset of
litigation. And since background principles underlie all takings claims,
including permanent physical occupations and appropriations, economic
wipeouts, and regulatory takings, courts will have ample opportunities to
consider the issue. Although the government must show the regulation is
grounded in property or nuisance principles, takings claimants must
shoulder the ultimate burden of demonstrating that their private property
has been taken.246 Because the issue will usually be a question of state
law, there will be no uniformity of background principles jurisprudence
among the jurisdictions, with the possible exception of federal takings
claims in the CFC and Federal Circuit.247
We are probably only at an early stage of background principles
jurisprudence. Given the government’s incentive to raise a background
principles defense early in all takings cases, and given the multiplicity of
jurisdictions interpreting the “private property” that is a prerequisite to a
takings determination, background principles are likely to continue to be
a dynamic area of property law in the years ahead.248

245. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31.
246. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 730
(2010) (“There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision, littoral-property owners had rights to future accretions and contact with the water
superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged land.”).
247. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.1 (2000).
248. Government defendants could contribute to the dynamism of background principles law
by linking statutes to other longstanding statutes or common law rules. See supra text
accompanying note 47 (observing that state statute recognizing access to burial sites was
consistent with longstanding other statutes and common law); supra text accompanying note 81
(discussing the Murr court decision to uphold the statutory merger provision, referring its
consistency “with a long history of state and local merger regulations that originated nearly a
century ago,” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1947 (2017)).
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